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Dubey and Geanakoplos [2002] have developed a theory of competitive pooling, which incor-
porates adverse selection and signaling into general equilibrium. By recasting the Rothschild-
Stiglitz model of insurance in this framework, they ﬁnd that a separating equilibrium always
exists and is unique.
We prove that their uniqueness result is not a consequence of the framework, but rather of
their deﬁnition of reﬁned equilibria. When other types of perturbations are used, the model
allows for many pooling allocations to be supported as such: in particular, this is the case for
pooling allocations that Pareto dominate the separating equilibrium.
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The goal of this paper is to show that, when the Rothschild and Stiglitz [7] model of insurance is
recast as a model of competitive pooling, it admits many equilibria. This is contrary to the recent
result by Dubey and Geanakoplos [1], by which the model has a unique equilibrium that coincides
with the separating equilibrium of Rothschild and Stiglitz. It is shown that this uniqueness result is
not a consequence of the competitive pooling framework per se, but stems rather from the particular
tremble that is used in deﬁning reﬁned equilibria.
In their paper, Dubey and Geanakoplos analyze the phenomenon of pooling in a general equilib-
rium framework which incorporates adverse selection and signaling. Their setting is characterized
by households that diﬀer in their reliability and trade by making contributions to a collection of
pools: these, in turn, diﬀer through their quantity limits on contributions, so that the maximum
amount of “shares” that any given household can buy diﬀers across pools. In equilibrium, pools
with lower quantity limits sell for a higher price, even though each household’s deliveries are the
same at all pools.
One of the main features of their construction is that they use a tremble “on the market” in
order to specify equilibria: since pools that are inactive at equilibrium receive no contributions
and make no payments, the anticipated returns of these pools cannot be pinned down by rational
expectations. To overcome this problem, they perturb the equilibrium by introducing an external
agent that makes contributions to all pools along the perturbation, constructing in this way a
reﬁned equilibrium.
After developing the framework, Dubey and Geanakoplos reinterpret Rothschild and Stiglitz’s
model of insurance (henceforth, [RS]) as a particular case of competitive pooling. They show
that, by recasting the model in this perfectly competitive fashion, an equilibrium always exists
under the assumptions of exclusivity and no cross-subsidization among the pools. Furthermore,
the equilibrium is proved to be unique and to correspond to the [RS] separating equilibrium.
The result of Dubey and Geanakoplos regarding existence, although in stark contrast to the
features of the strategic model, is based on ﬁxed point arguments that are common in the literature.
Their uniqueness result, however, is more surprising at ﬁrst glance. The reason is that, typically,
models with incomplete information have many diﬀerent equilibrium allocations supported by dif-
ferent beliefs about inactive markets.
The object of this paper is precisely to show that the uniqueness result of Dubey and Geanako-
1plos is not a consequence of the competitive pooling framework per se, but stems rather from the
particular tremble they use in deﬁning reﬁned equilibria. In this regard, they use what they deﬁne
as an optimistic tremble, by which the external agent is assumed to deliver more than any of the
households in the economy. We prove that under diﬀerent trembles, all incentive compatible and
feasible pooling allocations that Pareto dominate the [RS] separating equilibrium can be supported
as reﬁned equilibria of the model. On the other hand, the model has a unique separating equilibrium
regardless of the tremble that is assumed.
In games with asymmetric information, it is well known that the set of equilibria generally
depends on the reﬁnement of Nash equilibrium that is used. In the particular case of adverse se-
lection, Hellwig [5] has also pointed out that the set of equilibria depends on the exact manner in
which competition is modeled, or - more generally - on the game form that speciﬁes the interaction
between informed and uninformed agents in the model. It can thus be thought that the charac-
teristics of the tremble invoked represent to the model of competitive pooling what the details of
game theoretic interaction and the use of equilibrium reﬁnements are to strategic models of adverse
selection: one must fully specify them in order to discuss the properties of equilibria.
A similar point has been previously made by Gale ([2],[3],[4]) in a series of papers in which
he analyzes markets with adverse selection from a general equilibrium perspective. In Gale [2],
he discusses the use of diﬀerent reﬁnements in order to specify equilibria of the competitive model
with adverse selection: in particular, he shows that separating equilibria are the most robust, in the
sense that they are the only ones to satisfy the Kohlberg-Mertens [6] stability criterion. Although
we do not explore this issue for lack of space, the working version of the paper argues that this
is precisely the underlying feature that drives the uniqueness result of Dubey and Geanakoplos:
by assuming a very high delivery on behalf of the external agent, they are implicitly using the
Kohlberg-Mertens stability criterion to deﬁne reﬁned equilibria. By reducing the contribution of
the external agent, we are in fact weakening the reﬁnement concept to resemble the original notion
of “trembling-hand”.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the framework used by Dubey and
Geanakoplos. Section 3 identiﬁes the set of feasible, incentive compatible allocations of the model
and proves that the latter has many pooling equilibria and a unique separating equilibrium.
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2.1 Households
Consider a one-good economy with a continuum of households denoted by a superscript  ∈ (01].
Households are divided into two types, “reliable” and “unreliable”, with population measures of
 and  respectively. All uncertainty in this economy is idiosyncratic, and each of the  = 
states of nature can be of two kinds for any one household: a “good” state, in which endowment
is positive (and, to simplify, equal to one unit), or a “bad” state, in which endowment is zero. A
reliable household is deﬁned as having zero endowment in  out of the total  states, whereas an
unreliable household has a bad state in  of them, where  If consumption of household  in
state  is denoted by 










) for all  ∈ (0] (1)
where it is assumed that 0  0, 00  0 and lim→0 0()=∞.
This setup looks very similar to that of the [RS] model of insurance. There is, however, an
important diﬀerence that arises from explicitly considering the possible states of the world. In this
sense, although all reliable households have zero endowment in  out of the  states, the actual
s t a t e sw h i c ha r eb a dd i ﬀer across reliable households. This characteristic of the model requires
some care in the way in which households and types are deﬁned: however, we avoid dealing with it
directly by making the following assumption
(A1) Given any non-null set of households of type  (), a proportion 
 (
) of them will have a
bad state in any given state.
(A1) will be assumed to hold not just in equilibrium but also in deviation from equilibrium.
Although this assumption might seem to raise the usual diﬃculties, it is of widespread use in the
literature and one of the original assumptions of [RS]. In any case, it is possible to show that (A1)
can be derived from a fairly standard general equilibrium setting with contingent endowment.
2.2 Trade
It is assumed that households can only trade through contributions to a collection of pools indexed
by  ∈  = {1}: by contributing to pools, households acquire the right to a share of the
3latter’s resources but also the obligation to make certain deliveries. Pools diﬀer in the maximum
amount that can be contributed to them, which we denote by the vector  ∈ 
+: as a convention,
we assume 1  2    1   
Consequently, each household is entitled to contribute 0 ≤ 
 ≤  promises to pool ,w h i c h
oblige him to make state-contingent deliveries  ∈ 
+ per unit of promise: without loss of gener-
ality, we assume  =  for all . Additionally, the contribution entitles the household to a share
of the pool’s total resources. We maintain the following assumption throughout the paper,
(A2) No cross-subsidization: the payments made by each pool must necessarily come from their
own revenues.
Therefore, the economy is deﬁned by ((  )∈(01]()∈). When a household contributes

 to pool , he agrees to delivering 
 in his good states and receiving 
 from the pool in each





 denotes the return of pool  in state , ¯  =
R 1
0 
 denotes the pool’s aggregate holding of promises and  ∈ 
×(01]
+ denotes the contributions
of all households across pools. Note that no single household can aﬀect the return of any pool ,
which is denoted by the vector  =( 1 ) ∈ 
+. From their perspective then, the feasible
trades are given by the ﬁxed matrix  = () ∈ ×
+ ,i nw h i c ht h e()th element is given by
() as previously deﬁned. The consumption of household  ∈ (01] in each state ,w h e nh i s




 +(  − 
) (2)
where  =( 1 ) ∈ 
+ and  ≤  ∈ 
+. His budget set can then be expressed as,
()={() ∈ 
+ × 
+ :  = ()} (3)
Given this setup, we are ready to deﬁne an equilibrium of the economy. The only thing that
needs to be addressed before doing so refers to the speciﬁcation of the return vector  for pools that
are inactive at equilibrium. Since these pools receive no contributions and make no payments, their
returns are not speciﬁed and cannot be anticipated by rational households. However, a complete
speciﬁcation of the latter’s optimization problem must include some beliefs about the return of
inactive pools, which must therefore be speciﬁed in order to obtain a characterization of equilibria.
42.3 The equilibrium reﬁnement
Dubey and Geanakoplos deal with the anticipated deliveries of inactive pools by establishing an
analogy between them and game theoretic beliefs “oﬀ the equilibrium path”. Building on this
analogy, and recalling Selten’s use of trembles to deal with the latter problem, they too invoke a
tremble but “on the market” instead of on households.
In this regard, they consider an external -agent who - along a sequence - contributes nonneg-
ative amounts ()=( ())∈ ∈ 
+ to every pool and delivers a ﬁxed vector  =( ) ∈

+ per unit contributed to any particular pool. They then require that  ≥ max= 
 for all
 ∈ ,a n dc a l la n y satisfying this requirement optimistic Finally, they assume that () → 0 as
 →∞ , suggesting that the agent might be interpreted as a government that guarantees delivery
on the ﬁrst inﬁnitesimal promises.1 In formal terms, they deﬁne a reﬁned equilibrium as follows:





+ of the economy ((  )∈(01]







+ such that  is optimistic, () and () are measurable for all
 =1 23and
(1) () → 0, () →  and () → , () →  for almost all 
(2) (() ()) ∈ argmax()∈(()) () for almost all  and all 
(3) ()  0 if ¯ ()=0 ,f o ra l l ∈  and all ,







Ar e ﬁned equilibrium is then deﬁned as the limit of a sequence of equilibria of the perturbed
economy, along which the external agent contributes to inactive pools and hence allows for the
household optimization problem to be well deﬁned. Under our assumptions, it can be proved that
ar e ﬁned equilibrium always exists in the ﬁnite type continuum model with diﬀerent pools.
Before proceeding, it is worthwhile to highlight some aspects of the framework. Note that,
in principle, a pool’s return could vary across states: however, due to (A1) and to the fact that
the external agent delivers the same across all states, () will be fully determined and state-
invariant for a given composition of households that contribute to pool . Hence, the optimization
1To simplify computations, they actually drop the contributions of the external agent in those pools that are active
in equilibrium.
5problem will be identical for all households of the same type, and we can therefore rewrite the
model in these terms.
We also follow Dubey and Geanakoplos by maintaining the following assumption in what re-
mains of the paper:
(A3) Exclusivity constraint: each household can contribute to at most one pool2
Hence, we can deﬁne 1 −  = 
 and 1 −  = 
 and rewrite (1) as
 = ()+( 1− )() (4)
where,  =  and





where, because of (A3), 
 represents the only nonzero element of the vector of contributions
 Additionally, and with some abuse of notation, we henceforth let  ∈ + represent the
return of pool , which for the reasons outlined above is invariant across states. Finally, we use
¯  = + to denote the population’s average probability of a good state. This representation
of the model, in terms of good and bad states, is has the advantage of allowing the use of the
t r a d i t i o n a lg r a p h i c a lr e p r e s e n t a t i o no f[ R S ] .
Note that if the return of pool  across states is constant and given by , a household that
contributes  to it gives up  consumption in the good states and receives  in every state.
On the net, then, such a household foregoes (1 − ) units of consumption in his good states
in exchange for  units in the bad states, thereby shifting consumption from the former to the
latter at a rate of

1−.
3 Equilibria of the Model
The present section analyzes how the set of equilibria of the model depends on the external agent’s
delivery rate. We prove that, besides the [RS] separating equilibrium, the model also displays
2This assumption, which delivers a non-convex budget set, does not aﬀect the existence of an equilibrium, as
Dubey and Geanakoplos show.
6many pooling equilibria: in particular, all pooling allocations that Pareto dominate the former
can be supported as such. It must be remembered that (A1), (A2) and (A3) are assumed to
hold throughout the analysis. We proceed by identifying the set of feasible, incentive compatible
allocations of the model and then analyze which one of them can be supported as pooling or
separating reﬁned equilibria.
3.1 Feasible, incentive compatible allocations
The following lemma identiﬁes the set of feasible, incentive compatible separating and pooling
allocations of the model. An allocation is said to be feasible if, in all open pools, the payments
distributed among contributing households equal the revenues received from household deliveries.
Regarding incentive compatibility, an allocation is said to be incentive compatible if households do
not gain by deviating to other open pools or by changing the level of their contribution to any open
pool.
It is obviously the case that in separating allocations, all but two pools will be closed, while
all but one will be closed in pooling allocations. Up to now, it has been assumed that there is a
ﬁnite number of pools. For the remaining of the paper, however, we will consider the competitive
insurance model with a continuum of pools  ∈ [0],w h e r e  1 and  ∗ ⇐⇒   ∗.3
Lemma 1 There exist a continuum of feasible, incentive compatible separating and pooling alloca-
tions.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind the previous lemma can be explained as follows. In the case of separating
allocations, whenever unreliable types contribute to a pool  ≤ 1, there is a unique pool   
such that reliable (unreliable) types contributing to the former (latter) is both feasible and incentive
compatible. In the case of pooling allocations, any allocation in which both types contribute to the
same pool  an amount equal to  is also feasible and incentive compatible.
This identiﬁes the set of feasible, incentive compatible allocations of the competitive insurance
model. We will now identify the subset of such allocations that can be supported as reﬁned
equilibria, and assess how this subset changes depending on the delivery rate of the external agent.
Before proceeding, however, let us consider the case of  =0 .
3The use of a continuum of pools poses some potential problems for existence in the model: however, it is done
here solely to avoid some uninteresting complications and in order to simplify the exposition. Qualitatively, the
results would be the same if there were ﬁnitely many pools.
7Remark 2 All of the allocations mentioned in Lemma 1 can be supported as reﬁned equilibria if
the external agent delivery rate is set at  =0 .
The previous remark merits no further comments, since it’s clear that agents will choose only
among the pools that are active in equilibrium if they expect all inactive ones to deliver nothing.
However, since all the allocations considered in the lemma are incentive compatible and feasible,
this is equivalent to saying that they can be supported as reﬁned equilibria. Thus, the model
displays many reﬁned equilibria when  =0 .
3.2 Pooling Equilibria
The present subsection shows that, given an external agent delivery rate  ∈ [ ¯ ],a n yf e a s i b l e
and incentive compatible pooling allocation of the model can be supported as a reﬁned equilibrium
provided that the unreliable households prefer it to the [RS] separating allocation. In particular,
this means that when such a pooling allocation Pareto dominates the [RS] separating one, it can
be supported as a reﬁned equilibrium if the delivery rate of the external agent lies in the interval
speciﬁed above. The statement of the proposition, which is proved in the Appendix, is as follows:
Proposition 1 If the external agent’s delivery rate is set at  ∈ [ ¯ ], all of the feasible, incentive
compatible pooling allocations of the competitive insurance model can be supported as reﬁned equi-
libria as long as the unreliable households prefer it to the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating allocation.
Since the proof of the proposition is constructive and thus somewhat cumbersome, it is worth-
while to portray the intuition behind it. The challenge is to construct a perturbation by switching
disjoint sets of households into pools that are inactive at equilibrium and letting the external agent
contribute to them as well: additionally, this must be done in such a way as to avoid deviations
along the perturbation.
We achieve this by moving unreliable households to pools with higher quantity constraints than
the pooling allocation (i.e., pools “to the left” of the pooling allocation in Figure 3) and reliable
households to those with lower constraints (pools “to the right”). The measures of reliable and
unreliable households that are moved are chosen so as to keep the return of the pooling allocation
constant. Once households have been moved in this fashion, the external agent is introduced in
order to make unreliable households indiﬀerent among all the pools to which their type contributes,
while the same must be true for reliable households: note that the latter is possible only because
8the external agent’s delivery is weakly below the average of the economy. Additionally, it must
be considered that this construction does not rule out the possibility of having some pools where
the external agent is the sole contributor: it must be the case, however, that these pools are not
preferred by any household to the pooling allocation. Any perturbation constructed along these
lines will clearly satisfy the deﬁnition of reﬁned equilibria, and will therefore support the pooling
allocation as such.
The result by which pooling allocations may be supported as equilibria for some delivery rates
is not surprising, since the main problem for doing so arises from their fragility to deviations by
reliable households: it is enough for a pool immediately to the “right” of the equilibrium to exhibit a
return higher than ¯  in order for it to attract reliable households, eventually destroying the pooling
allocation. Thus, such an equilibrium can only be supported by perturbations in which  ≤ ¯ .T h i s
is the reason why Dubey and Geanakoplos, by assuming  =1 , conclude that the model has no
pooling equilibria.
3.3 Separating Equilibria
In the case of separating equilibria, we prove that the model has only one for all delivery rates  ≥
: the [RS] separating allocation. Considered jointly, the previous and the following propositions
show that for delivery rates  ∈ [ ¯ ] there are many pooling allocations that can be supported as
reﬁned equilibria of the model, whereas only a unique separating allocation - the [RS] separating
allocation - can be supported as such for all delivery rates  ≥ .
Proposition 2 For all delivery rates  ≥  the only separating allocations that can be supported
as a reﬁned equilibrium of the competitive insurance model is the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating
allocation.
Proof. We ﬁrst argue that for any delivery rate  ≥  no feasible, incentive compatible separating
allocation diﬀerent from the [RS] one can be supported as a reﬁned equilibrium. To address
this, consider ﬁrst the set of such allocations in which unreliable households are contributing less
than they would like to at a return of . For any  ≥ ,h o w e v e r , is the lower bound
for anticipated returns of inactive pools, so unreliable households will immediately move their
contributions to pool  for which  =1 . Alternatively, consider a feasible, incentive compatible
separating allocation in which unreliable households contribute to a pool  for 1 In such a
scenario, their contribution to pool  will be equal to one, and so such an allocation will be de
9facto equivalent to the [RS] separating allocation. Hence, no other separating allocation can be
supported as a reﬁned equilibrium.
It remains then to be shown that the [RS] allocation itself can be supported as a reﬁned
equilibrium for any  ≥ . This must in fact be the case since - as Dubey and Geanakoplos
show - it can be supported as such for  =1 . Since the eﬀect of lowering  below one is essentially
to decrease the return on inactive pools, the [RS] separating allocation must still be a reﬁned
equilibrium. If this were not the case, it means that it is possible to make households indiﬀerent
between the equilibrium allocation and any deviation to inactive pools when  =1but not when
1, a contradiction since inactive pools are less attractive under the latter perturbation.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The object of this paper has been to show that the set of equilibria in the competitive version of
the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance depends on the perturbation that is used. For external
agent delivery rates  ∈ [ ¯ ] the model allows for many pooling equilibria besides the Rothschild-
Stiglitz separating equilibrium: for higher delivery rates, only the latter survives.
The working version of the paper also shows that diﬀerent delivery rates of the external agent
amount to invoking diﬀerent concepts of equilibrium reﬁnement. Thus, our competitive analysis
has a strong analogy in the case of games with asymmetric information, where the set of equilibria
depends on the competitive reﬁnement of Nash equilibrium or on the particular game form that
is used. Regarding the latter, Hellwig [5] has stressed that the conclusions of strategic models
of adverse selection are very sensitive to the details of the game form that is assumed: in the
particular case of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model, for example, the existence of equilibrium and its
characteristics are deeply aﬀected by whether the game is modeled as having two or three stages. In
much the same way, the perturbation used in the competitive version of the model has a substantial
eﬀect on the conclusions reached: it alone will determine whether the equilibrium may be pooling
or separating and, consequently, whether it will be Pareto optimal or not.
Finally, what type of reﬁnement or external agent delivery should then be used? Although an
in-depth discussion of the issue exceeds the scope of this paper, it can nonetheless be said that
the right approach should depend on the interpretation that is given to the perturbation. If the
perturbation is to be interpreted as households’ irrationality or as mistakes which grow vanishingly
small at the equilibrium, then it seems reasonable to prioritize robustness in the solution concept:
10any other choice would imply an assessment regarding the greater likelihood of some mistakes with
respect to others, which seems rather arbitrary at best. On the other hand, if the perturbation
is to be interpreted as some type of government signal or action, as suggested by Dubey and
Geanakoplos, then there is no a priori reason to justify any one delivery rate over another and -
even though it should still be taken into consideration - robustness would not seem to be an issue
of great concern.4 In fact, the ﬁndings of this paper are very intuitive when applied to the latter
setting: if a government wishes to support a pooling equilibrium because of its greater eﬃciency,
then it should “encourage” reliable households to stay there by inducing relatively low anticipated
returns in other markets. On the other hand, it is obvious that if the government somehow increases
anticipated returns in inactive markets (as the external agent with high delivery rates does) then
a pooling allocation cannot survive as an equilibrium.
4Note that robustness is still a source of concern because we have shown only that it is possible for the optimal
pooling allocation to be a reﬁned equilibrium under certain government delivery rates, not that it will necessarily
arise as the equilibrium. This is due to the fact that we have restricted the external agent´s delivery rate to be
constant across pools: if this restriction were relaxed, so that the external agent could vary its delivery rate across
pools, then it would be possible to construct perturbations where the optimal pooling allocation is the only reﬁned
equilibrium of the economy.
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125A p p e n d i x
Lemma 1. Existence of a continuum of feasible, incentive compatible separating
allocations: Consider the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating allocation, where unreliable households
contribute ()=1to pool  ∈  for which  =1  Now consider that all the unreliable
households contribute to pool ¯ instead, so that they choose a bundle  along the -price
line for which ()  1 (see Figure 1 below). Deﬁne  to be the intersection of the ()
indiﬀerence curve with the -price line, and deﬁne ∗ ∈  so that ∗ = ().C l e a r l y , a n y
allocation ( ) constructed in this way, in which unreliable households contribute to pool ¯ 
and reliable households to pool ∗, is incentive compatible. Feasibility is obviously guaranteed by
the nature of the pools considered, which deliver no more than what they receive. There exist a









Qj  1 x U  Qj ̄  1
Figure 1: A feasible, IC, separating allocation
Existence of a continuum of feasible, incentive compatible pooling allocations: Deﬁne
¯  as the point on the ¯ -price line that satisﬁes,
(¯ ) = argmax
 [(1 − (¯ ) · (1 − ¯ )) + (1 − )((¯ ) · ¯ )]
i.e., the tangency point for the reliable households on the ¯ -price line (see Figure 2 below).
Clearly, if ∗ is deﬁned so that ∗ = (¯ ), the allocation where both types contribute (¯ ) to pool
∗ is feasible and incentive compatible. The incentive compatibility of this allocation comes from
the fact that reliable households are contributing exactly what they want to the pool: unreliable
13households, on the other hand, would like to contribute more but are constrained by the quantity
limit. Therefore, all households end up contributing the same amount. It follows immediately that
a continuum of such allocations can be constructed: in fact, we may do so for all pools  ∗,t o












Figure 2: Pooling allocation preferred by reliable types
Proposition 1. Since the proof uses graphs to simplify the exposition, let us comment on the
notation used. We do so through Figure 3, which depicts the pooling allocation mostly preferred by
reliable types. Given the bundle ¯  =( ¯  ¯ ),w ew i l ld e ﬁne (¯ ) to be the quantity line passing
through ¯ . In the same manner, we will deﬁne (¯ ) to be the price line passing through ¯  (which,
in the case of a pooling allocation, coincides with the ¯ -price line) and (¯ ) and (¯ ) to be,
respectively, the reliable and unreliable households’ indiﬀerence curves passing through ¯ .
Let all households contribute (¯ ) to pool ∗ ,w h e r e(¯ )=∗ and ¯  is the point on the






1−¯ . This situation is depicted in Figure 3 above. The choice
of ∗ is motivated to simplify the exposition, but the proof goes through for any other feasible,
incentive compatible pooling allocation (i.e., in which only one pool  is active, for some  ∗)It
is assumed that the utility of the unreliable households in this pooling allocation is higher than
what they would obtain in the [RS] separating allocation. Once it has been proved that the pooling
allocation can be supported as a reﬁned equilibrium, it will become clear why this condition is












Figure 3: Pooling allocation preferred by reliable types
In order to prove that such a pooling allocation can be supported as a reﬁned equilibrium, all
inactive pools must be priced in a way that satisﬁes the equilibrium reﬁnement. In a ﬁrst step, we
will determine the required prices of inactive pools. Once this has been done, we will construct a
sequence that supports the allocation as a reﬁned equilibrium.
Step 1: For pools  with  ∗,t h e-quantity line intersects (¯ ) before it intersects (¯ ).
Let ˆ  be the quantity whose line intersects (¯ ) at ˆ ,d e ﬁn e di nt h ef o l l o w i n gw a y ,
ˆ  =a r gm i n() (5)
s.t. ()=(¯ )
Then, there are two possibilities:
a)   ˆ   ∗.I nt h i sc a s e ,l e t ≤ (ˆ ) (Region A in Figure 4)
b) ˆ  ≥   ∗, so that the -quantity line intersects (¯ ) at ˜ .I n t h i s c a s e , s e t
 ≤ (˜ ), where the equality is in accordance with the dotted line in Figure 4 that connects
(1,0) with ˜  (Region B in Figure 4).
For pools  with  ∗,t h e-quantity line intersects (¯ ) before it intersects (¯ ).L e tˆ 
be the point where (¯ ) intersects the -price line, and let ˆ  be the quantity whose line passes
through it. Once again, there are two possibilities:
15a) ∗ ≥   ˆ , so that the -quantity line intersects (¯ ) at ˜ .I n t h i s c a s e , s e t
 ≤ (˜ ), where the equality is in accordance with the dotted line in Figure 4 that connects
(1,0) with ˜  (Region C in Figure 4).
b) ∗  ˆ  ≥ ,i nw h i c hc a s e ≤  (Region D in Figure 4).
Given these returns for all  6= ∗,i tc a nb ee a s i l yv e r i ﬁed that no household can improve his
utility by using pool . Thus, such returns could deﬁne an equilibrium: all that needs to be done
in order to conclude the proof is to construct a perturbation  =( ()()()()) to show

















Q ̂ U Q ̂ R
Figure 4: Pools in Regions A, B, C and D
Step 2: The perturbation is constructed by switching disjoint sets of households from their
equilibrium actions onto inactive pools, thus deﬁning 
() for  6= ∗ and  = . In order to
calculate the returns of these pools along the -sequence, the contributions of the external agent







() is the measure of households of type  moved to pool  along the perturbation.
As long as it is possible to construct returns () that are consistent with the equilibrium returns
considered in Step 1, the pooling allocation can be supported as a reﬁned equilibrium.
It must be noted that there are two possibilities when  ∈ [ ¯ ].I n t h e ﬁrst case, suppose
that  ≤ (ˆ ),w h e r e(ˆ ) is deﬁn e da si n( 5 )a b o v e . W i t hs u c hal o wc o n t r i b u t i o nb yt h e
external agent, any perturbation which involves not moving any households away from the pooling
allocation will suﬃce: the return of all inactive pools, being solely determined by the external
16a g e n t ,w i l ln o tb es u ﬃciently high as to induce deviations by any of the households.
Consider instead that the contribution of the external agent  is contained in the interval
((ˆ ) ¯ ]. In this case, any perturbation will have to imply the movement of disjoint set of
households from the pooling allocation to inactive pools. This immediately poses the following
questions:
a) What measures of reliable and unreliable households should be moved away from the pooling
allocation?
b) How should these measures be distributed among inactive pools?
We answer the ﬁrst question in such a way as to maintain the return of the pooling allocation
unaltered, i.e., we move measures  of reliable households and  of unreliable ones along the
perturbation, where,
 = 
(¯  − )
( − ¯ )
∀ (6)
 → 0  → 0 as  →∞ (7)
Regarding the distribution of households among inactive pools, it will be done in the following
manner. The unreliable households will be uniformly distributed between pools  and ,w h e r e
the latter is the pool whose quantity line passes through 
 , the point where (¯ ) intersects the
-price line. Thus, (
 )= and (
 )= (see Figure 5).5 Thus, each of these pools will
receive a measure  of such households, where
R 
  =  for all . As for the remaining
inactive pools, they won’t receive any unreliable households.
With respect to reliable households, we will distribute measures  of them - satisfying condition
(6) - uniformly among pools between ∗ and ˆ .6 No households will thus be switched to pools
 for   ˆ .
We shall now prove that a perturbation constructed along the previous lines can support the
pooling allocation as a reﬁned equilibrium.
5In terms of Figure 5, this means that unreliable households will be distributed among all pools in region A and
p a r to ft h eo n e si nr e g i o nB .

















Figure 5: -price line and corresponding 

Consider the pools  for which   ˆ  (Region A in Figure 4). Let a set of unreliable
households of measure  move out of pool ∗ and contribute to pool .I f  = (ˆ ) for all
these pools, unreliable households will always optimize by contributing ˆ  to any of them. Because
(ˆ )  ¯  and  ∈ ((ˆ ) ¯ ],i ti sa l w a y sp o s s i b l et oc h o o s e()  0 to satisfy
 ˆ  + ()
 ˆ  + ()
= (ˆ )
Consider now the pools  for which ˆ  ≥   ∗ (Region B in Figure 4). Once again, let
a set of unreliable households of measure  move out of pool ∗ and contribute  to pool ,
for   as deﬁned above. Deﬁning ˜  as the point where the -quantity line intersects (¯ ),




for all  ∈ ((ˆ ) ¯ ].A sf o rp o o l s contained between  and ∗, their only contribution will
be given by the external agent: since by construction (˜ 
 )  , no unreliable households will
have incentives to deviate from the pooling allocation and contribute to these pools.
Next, take  for which ∗    ˆ  (Region C in Figure 4). Let a set of reliable households
of measure  move out of pool ∗ and contribute  to pool .D e ﬁning ˜  as the point where




for all  ∈ [ ¯ ].
Finally, take  for which  ≤ ˆ   ∗ (Region D in Figure 4). In this case, the only one
contributing to the pools is the external agent, whose delivery is  ∈ [ ¯ ]. Clearly, reliable
18households will not want to contribute anything to these pools.
Note that in all these cases then, household optimality holds and () is justiﬁed by us-
ing a reasonably pessimistic tremble. Then, it is conﬁrmed that a perturbation satisfying these
requirements supports the pooling allocation as a reﬁned equilibrium.
It should be clear by now why it is necessary that unreliable households prefer the pooling
allocation to the Rothschild-Stiglitz separating one. If that is not the case, then (ˆ ) as deﬁned
a b o v em u s tb es m a l l e rt h a n, meaning that some inactive pools would have to oﬀer an anticipated
return below  if the pooling allocation is to be supported as a reﬁned equilibrium. This is clearly
impossible, since  is the lower bound of both households’ and the external agent’s contributions
when a reasonably pessimistic tremble is used.
19